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Abstract—Citadel is an advanced information-stealing mal-
ware which targets financial information. This malware poses a
real threat against the confidentiality and integrity of personal
and business data. A joint operation was recently conducted
by the FBI and the Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit in order to
take down Citadel command-and-control servers. The operation
caused some disruption in the botnet but has not stopped it
completely. Due to the complex structure and advanced anti-
reverse engineering techniques, the Citadel malware analysis
process is both challenging and time-consuming. This allows cyber
criminals to carry on with their attacks while the analysis is
still in progress. In this paper, we present the results of the
Citadel reverse engineering and provide additional insight into
the functionality, inner workings, and open source components
of the malware. In order to accelerate the reverse engineering
process, we propose a clone-based analysis methodology. Citadel
is an offspring of a previously analyzed malware called Zeus; thus,
using the former as a reference, we can measure and quantify
the similarities and differences of the new variant. Two types of
code analysis techniques are provided in the methodology, namely
assembly to source code matching and binary clone detection. The
methodology can help reduce the number of functions requiring
manual analysis. The analysis results prove that the approach is
promising in Citadel malware analysis. Furthermore, the same
approach is applicable to similar malware analysis scenarios.
Keywords—Reverse Engineering, Malware Analysis, Clone De-
tection, Botnet Takedown, Incident Response, Zeus Botnet Variant,
Static Analysis, Dynamic Analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
Making headlines in recent months (March 2013 - July
2013) has been an offspring of Zeus malware known as
Citadel. Cyber criminals behind the Citadel malware have
stolen over 500 million dollars from online bank accounts [15].
Zeus is a prolific Trojan that has been stealing information
since 2007. In 2011, its source code was leaked on the internet
and became available to the underground community. Since
then, several malware have been developed based on the Zeus
source code. Citadel has been employed by botnet operators
to steal banking credentials and personal information [10],
[17]. In addition, Citadel has features that extend beyond
targeting financial institutions. Spying capabilities, such as
video capture, is an example of such features that literally
enables cyber criminals to collect anything from a victim’s
machine. The malware also acts as ransomware and scareware
in order to extort money from victims. Reverse engineering is
often the primary step taken to gain an in-depth understanding
of a piece of malware; however, it is both a challenging and
time-consuming process which requires a great deal of manual
intervention.
This article is the final draft post-refereeing version of the paper appeared
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The major objectives of this paper are to reverse engineer
the Citadel malware and gain more insight into its structure and
functionality. In particular, the objectives can be summarized
as follows:
1) Quantify the similarities and differences between
Citadel and Zeus malware.
2) Obtain additional insight into online open source
components used in Citadel.
3) Accelerate the reverse engineering process of similar
malware variants.
To enhance and speed up the process, a new approach termed
clone-based analysis is employed in this study. This paper illus-
trates the usefulness of the proposed approach in the analysis of
new variants of a malware family. In this scenario, a preceding
malware P is presumed to be analyzed and understood. If
a variant V uses portions of the P code, the approach will
highlight the shared portions. Consequently, disregarding the
clones could reduce the analysis time. In a more general case
where P is unknown, the approach can still provide insight
into the components of V in comparison to other sources.
The main contributions of this paper are three-fold: first,
a detailed reverse engineering analysis of the Citadel malware
is presented and its functionality is described. Second, a new
methodology for reverse engineering malware is proposed.
This methodology significantly decreases malware analysts’
efforts and reduces the analysis time. Third, the similarity
between the Citadel malware and the Zeus malware is precisely
quantified. Additional insights are also provided into the open-
source components used in the Citadel malware.
This case study was chosen for a number of reasons.
First, Citadel and Zeus are real threats against confidential-
ity, integrity and availability of information systems. Cyber
criminals are constantly enhancing their tools for gaining
access to personal and financial data. The profitability of
such crimeware tools in the underground market depends on
the timeliness and support for new vulnerabilities. For this
reason, malicious developers often reuse all or parts of existing
components during their incremental development process. As
a result, it is quite probable that they leave fingerprints of
previously analyzed malcode on new releases. Clone-based
analysis serves as a beneficial tool in such situations due to its
potential for producing quick results. Integrating a clone-based
analysis in the reverse engineering process will significantly
reduce the overall analysis time. The second benefit of this
case study is that it allows us to leverage our developed tools
such as RE-Source [7] and RE-Clone [8] in reverse engineering
sophisticated malware. The lessons learned during the analysis
would bring new opportunities for future extensions of our
tools. Third, the analysis provides us with practical solutions
Fig. 1. The overlap in reverse engineering methodologies.
for mitigating future threats in a timely fashion. Once the
analysis is performed on Zeus and Citadel, new Zeus-based
malware variants with shared components can be more quickly
analyzed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II is dedicated to explaining our methodology in studying
the malware. Section III details the dynamic analysis and ex-
plains the debugging process and memory forensic approaches.
The main features of the Citadel malware are also described
in this section. Section IV presents the static analysis and the
steps which led to the actual de-obfuscated code. Section V
presents the clone-based analysis. The threat mitigation is
briefly presented in Section VI, and the conclusion is drawn
in Section VIII.
II. METHODOLOGY
Static and dynamic analysis are commonly used in studying
malware [1], [5]. Static analysis focuses on malware code,
inspecting its structure and functionality without execution. In
contrast, dynamic analysis deals with behavior monitoring dur-
ing the malware execution. In general, the process of malware
reverse engineering is a combination of these two approaches,
which is both time-consuming and costly. The success of these
approaches is tightly coupled with the functionalities of the
tools and skills of the reverse engineer [3], [4].
To enhance and accelerate the process in analyzing the
Citadel malware, another dimension is considered in our study
as shown in Figure 1. This new dimension is called clone-
based analysis. In brief, the clone-based analysis identifies
the pieces of code in Citadel malware that originate from
other malware and open-source applications. This step is per-
formed automatically by leveraging the tools that are designed
and developed in our security lab [7], [8]. There are two
main advantages in considering this extra dimension in the
static analysis: first, it avoids dealing with low-level assembly
code in situations where the corresponding high-level code is
available; second, it prevents reverse engineering parts of the
malware that have already been analyzed. This approach is
very promising, especially in scenarios similar to Citadel that
share a significant portion of code with a previously reverse
engineered malware like Zeus [6]. The process of assembly
to source code matching is performed using the RE-Source
framework [7], and the binary clone matching is carried out
using RE-Clone [8].
The proposed methodology is composed of three processes.
Each process comprises several steps. We elaborate each step
in the following sections:
1) Static Analysis Process
• The disassembly is reviewed for finding ob-
fuscated segments, decoder stubs, and embed-
ded file images. The feasibility of static data
decryption is assessed. Switching to dynamic
analysis for code and data decryption may be
necessary.
• A suitable circumvention strategy is adopted
for bypassing the anti-static protection of the
malware. Having a de-obfuscated/decrypted
disassembly is a prerequisite for the clone-
based analysis process.
• Control flow analysis and data flow analy-
sis are applied to gain an understanding of
the crypto algorithms and encoding/decoding
functionality.
2) Dynamic Analysis Process
• A debugging environment is set to execute
the binary, attach the debugger, set the break-
points, control the unpacking, dump the pro-
cess memory, generate an executable image,
and save the process to file. The dumping
process is repeated according to the analysis
scenario.
• System calls are monitored, malware activities
are logged, network traffic is captured, down-
loaded files are backed up, and the commu-
nication protocol is observed. In addition, the
interesting artifacts are extracted.
3) Clone-based Analysis Process
• Using the unpacked and de-obfuscated disas-
sembly, a search is performed for standard and
open-source components by applying the as-
sembly to source-code matching technique of
RE-Source [7]. The data matching technique
encompasses two threads of online and offline
analysis. This step is repeated for all pro-
cess memory dumps and the set of matched
projects are stored as online analysis results.
• An offline analysis is performed for assigning
the functionality tags according to API call
classification in RE-Source. Function labels
are updated, the proportion of assembly func-
tions in each functionality group is calculated,
and the functionality tags are reviewed based
on the scenario.
• Using the unpacked and de-obfuscated disas-
sembly, a binary clone matching is performed
against the previously analyzed malware bina-
ries in RE-Clone. The occurrences of inexact
and exact clones are then recorded.
• The outputs of assembly to source-code
matching and binary clone matching are com-
bined for quantifying the similarities and dif-
ference of malware variants. The results draw
a high-level picture of the code.
• The clones are selectively used to guide the
static and dynamic analyses. In order to speed
up the process, the clones are removed and
the focus of analysis is shifted to the original
(non-clone) functions.
As illustrated in Figure 1, three connected processes are
defined in the proposed methodology. In the Citadel case study,
the dynamic analysis focuses on web debugging, memory
forensics, process injection and web injects. An important
aspect in this process is the observation of malware’s behavior
in response to controlled inputs. On the other hand, the static
analysis process focuses on assembly-level functions. De-
obfuscation could occur in the overlapping area of these two
methods. Unpacking and decryption are relevant examples that
fall in this area. It is assumed that a database of previously
analyzed code is available during the analysis. Code search
engines provide an interface to online open source code
repositories. Similarly, an offline code repository is maintained
for storing the malware assembly code and the results of
previous analysis sessions. One advantage of the clone-based
analysis is that it can guide the dynamic and static steps: it
highlights the important directions that the other two processes
should follow by eliminating code clones, recognizing library
functions, and providing additional comments. The analysis
focus is thus shifted to non-clone parts of the payload, resulting
in a shorter analysis time frame.
III. DYNAMIC ANALYSIS
The purpose of the dynamic analysis process is to execute
the malware and monitor its behavior in a controlled environ-
ment. Many tools and techniques are available for debugging
malware [2], [3]. Sandboxing is a common technique in
dynamic analysis used for running untrusted code in a virtual
setting; however, modern malware are well-equipped with anti-
virtual machine protection against popular tools such as Oracle
VirtualBox and VMWare Workstation. The malware can easily
sense whether it is running on a virtual machine by checking
certain artifacts in memory or on disk. As a result, the malware
might change its normal behavior by taking an alternative
execution path, thereby hindering the analysis. Malware can
go even one step further and try to exploit the virtual machine
vulnerabilities in order to gain access to the host operating
system. Successful dynamic analysis may thus require caution
and pre-processing steps. Debugging Citadel is challenging due
to the built-in anti-debugging and injection capabilities, but the
protection can be circumvented by choosing the right strategy.
As it will be discussed in Section V, RE-Source can provide
informative tags such as ADB, PSJ or AVM for functions that
potentially contain anti-debugging, process injection, or anti-
virtual machine functionality. Upon the first execution, Citadel
begins the infection process based on an embedded attack
configuration.
A. Citadel Infection Process
The Citadel bot operates in several modes. Upon the first
execution, the dropper is in the installation mode. First, it
unpacks and decrypts itself into memory. It then creates a
copy of the binary file and stores it in the %AppData%
folder under a randomly generated sub-folder and file name.
The bot file is referred to as Random.exe in this context.
As an example, the output path could be similar to: ...\App-
Data\Roaming\Random\Random.exe. The bot also generates a
batch file for removing the installation code. Checking for the
existence of this path is a way to determine whether the system
has been infected by the malware. Once the Random.exe is run
Fig. 2. Citadel process injection and agent mode.
Fig. 3. Decoded Citadel config file name and location.
from the new location, a sequence of similar steps are taken
for unpacking and decrypting the bot. Subsequently, the bot
switches to injection mode and injects itself into the Explorer
process and its child processes.
The injection step is dependent upon the privileges of the
user who runs the bot as well as the version of the operating
system. Following the injection, the bot process is terminated
and the installation files are removed. The bot also updates the
registry and adds an entity so that it will execute each time the
operating system boots up. The registry path would appear as:
HKU\...\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Rad.
The Random.exe is identical to the dropper except for the flag
bytes located at the end of the file. This portion is encrypted
and is used for controlling the bot mode. Thus, although the
two executables are very similar, their behavior is different as
the Random.exe operates only in agent and injection modes.
Upon each system startup, the bot initiates the intelligence
gathering process as demonstrated in Figure 2.
B. Debugging and Memory Forensics
After setting up the analysis environment and infecting
it with the malware, the bot execution can be monitored
and controlled using a scriptable debugger [18], [19]. Several
techniques are available for hiding the debugger process from
the bot and gaining more control over the debugger [2]. A web
debugger or a network protocol analyzer is used for monitoring
the HTTP network communication of the malware. Citadel
encrypts the command-and-control (C&C) network traffic with
RC4; therefore, the crypto keys are required to intercept the
commands and view the stolen data. One way to find the
keys is through debugging and setting hardware breakpoints
on functions that precede network communication.
As will be discussed in Section V, such network-related
functionality can be identified through the NET, WNT and
CRY tags assigned in the offline analysis. Upon success-
ful installation, the bot checks for Internet connectivity
and tries to connect to embedded C&C addresses in order
to announce its availability. The bot sends requests such
as POST /carfca/basket.php HTTP/1.1 or POST
/carfca/file.php HTTP/1.1 to the server. The server
then replies and sends the encrypted config file to the bot.
One major difference between Zeus and Citadel is in the
way they handle the transmission of the configuration file.
It was possible to find the location of the Zeus config file
and download it with minimal effort, whereas in Citadel, it
is more difficult to obtain the config file during the analysis.
Citadel uses dynamic APIs and decrypts strings in memory
during execution. This can be considered as an extra layer
of protection that prevents the config file from being easily
detected. Figure 3 shows one of the decrypted links to a Citadel
C&C server which hosts the encrypted “sport.doc” config file.
During the debug, the bot allocates memory for new segments
and overwrites the memory space with decrypted code and
data. The zero values in Figure 3 show the bytes that are yet
to be overwritten by data. Blocking the malware’s access to
the requested C&C and modifying its timing mechanism will
force the malware to enumerate the list of alternative embedded
C&C servers.
Several tools and plug-ins are available for dumping mem-
ory, reconstructing import tables, and fixing PE headers. Olly-
Dump and ImpRec are examples of such tools for unpacking
Citadel [1], [3]. Volatility [20] was the most versatile and
straightforward tool for memory forensics that was used in this
project. It automatically builds the import tables and generates
the executable versions of the unpacked binary. Volatility was
utilized for creating executable process dumps and retrieving
decrypted strings from memory. Figure 4 lists the utilized tools
and shows the number of detected functions, extracted strings,
and identified function imports during different stages of the
unpacking process.
Fig. 4. Unpacking stages of Citadel binary.
C. Citadel Attack Configuration
The bot options are set in the configuration file. This file
contains two sections for static and dynamic configuration as
depicted in Figure 5. The bot builder reads this file and embeds
the settings in the generated bot.exe. The bot encryption key is
also defined in this file. The static config section is where the
options for the initial attack are set. The setting for web injects
are defined in the dynamic config section. Web injects are
used for tricking users into revealing confidential information
such as additional passwords or PINs. Since the man-in-
the-middle attack (DLL hooking) occurs in libraries such as
wininet.dll or nspr4.dll, the victim user might not be able to
distinguish the injected data from the genuine page. The result
of injection could be in the form of extra fields, text boxes
or warning messages. In comparison to Zeus, Citadel has a
few extra features such as the anti-virus and security software
evasion mechanism. In addition, the DNS filter enables the bot
to block the victim from accessing security-related websites
and downloading new updates and patches. Consequently, the
machine is made more vulnerable to future attacks. A DNS
redirection technique is used for implementing this feature.
The config file includes a list of blocked websites and the
corresponding redirected IP addresses. The report in [17]
provides a list of Citadel DNS filter domains. This type of DNS
poisoning attack does not modify the Windows Hosts file. The
settings related to the dynamic configuration can be updated
by the C&C server according to predefined rules set by the
botmaster. For instance, new modules can be remotely installed
for country-specific web inject which target online banking
accounts, automatic money transfer, and ransom [13], [17].
The encrypted configuration file can be obtained by capturing
the bot traffic and replaying a crafted request in debugging.
Fig. 5. Structure of Citadel configuration file.
IV. STATIC ANALYSIS
In this section, we describe the main steps taken during the
static analysis of Citadel. The static malware analysis process
normally starts by disassembling the malware binary. However,
the initial disassembled code may not draw a complete picture
of the original code due to different layers of obfuscation.
Disassembling the Citadel malware using IDA Pro [19] results
in a packed binary containing merely 13 functions, 11 imports,
and 337 strings. The binary was compressed, encrypted, and
employed anti-reverse engineering techniques. Our static anal-
ysis therefore began by de-obfuscating the malware. According
to the first process of the proposed methodology, static and
dynamic techniques should be interleaved for advancing the
analysis.
A. Unpacking Step
Not surprisingly, the malware was packed with a non-
standard packing scheme, thus automatic unpacking tools
such as UPX could not be used and manual unpacking was
necessary. To unpack the malware, a combination of static
and dynamic techniques was used. The packed binary was
executed in Immunity debugger [18] until the unpacking stub
decompressed the binary in memory. Once the unpacking
procedure was completed, the unpacking stub transferred the
execution to the original entry point of the binary by making a
jump from one segment to another. At this moment, Volatility
[20] was used to dump the unpacked version of the binary’s
process out of memory and generate an executable unpacked
version of the binary. The generated binary contained roughly
800 functions, 386 imports, and more than 900 decrypted
strings.
B. Code Decryption Step
The unpacking allowed the static analysis to be resumed.
After this step, there still remained encrypted portions in the
binary code. One of the interesting points was located at the ad-
dress of 0x0040336 in our sample. An in-depth examination
of the function which cross-referenced this portion revealed the
structure of encrypted data and the decryption mechanism. As
shown in Figure 6, the structure size is 8 bytes and consists
of 4 chunks. The key for string decryption is embedded in
the binary file. Algorithm 1 presents the decryption procedure
used for decrypting the data. It helped us recover more than
300 strings and 45 C&C commands from the packed data in
the binary.
Fig. 6. Structure of the encrypted data.
Algorithm 1: String Decryption Procedure
/* The command for decrypting embedded
strings */
for j in range length do
UNPACKED_DATA =
join(char(PACKED_DATA[j]) ˆ j ˆ key)
C. Crypto Algorithms
The Zeus malware suffered from two main weaknesses:
receiving an RC4-encrypted configuration file from a C&C
server in response to a plain GET request, and reusing non-
random values for encrypted messages. To overcome these
weaknesses, significant improvements concerning crypto al-
gorithms have been made in Citadel. As shown in Figure 7,
the Citadel C&C server requires a specially crafted RC4-
encrypted POST message to send the configuration file. In
addition, in order to provide better security, the configuration
file is encrypted using AES. The Citadel authors have used a
composition of different ciphers as shown in Figures 8 and 9.
The RC4 encryption (Figure 8) starts by a customized encoding
(obfuscation) mechanism known as Visual Encrypt (VE).
The input to the algorithm is an encoded buffer. The VE
code is provided in Algorithm 2. This function was used in
Zeus for crypto purposes as well. After the XOR operation,
Fig. 7. Communication messages for retrieving the configuration file.
Fig. 8. Citadel RC4 encryption process.
Algorithm 2: Visual Encrypt Procedure
void Crypt::VisualEncrypt(void *buffer,
DWORD size) {
for (DWORD i = 1; i < size; i++) do
((LPBYTE)buffer)[i] ˆ = ((LPBYTE)buffer)[i - 1];
}
the non-standard RC4 initialization routine generates a 0x100-
byte key based on the static configuration data embedded in the
binary. The output of the routine is a new RC4 key that is used
in RC4 encryption function along with the customized XOR-ed
data. Finally, performing an XOR on the RC4 output and the
login key embedded in the binary results in the RC4 encrypted
data. Given login_key=lkey and VE=encode, the functional-
ity can be stated as: out = lkey XOR RC4rkey(encode(in)).
Therefore, out=Enc(in). The AES decryption is depicted in
Figure 9. The configuration decryption routine takes as input
the embedded static configuration data and produces as output
the RC4 key. The MD5 hashed login key and the embedded
RC4 key are fed to the RC4 routine. Subsequently, the AES
key is generated by performing an XOR on the output of the
RC4 routine and the login key. This key is used by the AES
decryption function. Finally, the Visual Decrypt (VD) function
(Algorithm 3) takes the result of the AES routine and decodes
the decrypted data. The process can be formulated as: AESkey =
MD5(lkey) XOR RC4rkey. Given VD=decode, the output can be
stated as: out = decode(AESAES_key(in)). The weakest point in
the crypto process is that it is based on static config data, which
shows that the authors lack competency in security algorithms
and cipher composition.
Fig. 9. Citadel AES decryption process.
V. CLONE-BASED ANALYSIS
The third process of the proposed methodology focuses
on clone-based analysis, which can be applied to complement
the process of reverse engineering. It could be particularly
helpful in reducing the time required for the static analysis
phase. In this context, two techniques are taken into account
for quantifying the similarities between Citadel and Zeus
samples. The first approach uses RE-Source in order to reveal
the open-source building blocks of the malware. The second
Algorithm 3: Visual Decrypt Procedure
void Crypt::VisualDecrypt(void *buffer,
DWORD size) {
if size > 0 then
for (DWORD i = size − 1; i > 0; i−−) do
((LPBYTE)buffer)[i] ˆ= ((LPBYTE)buffer)[i -
1];
}
approach utilizes RE-Clone for binary code matching. The
major steps in the clone-based methodology can be enumerated
as follows: (1) identification of standard algorithms and open-
source library code in the malware disassembly, (2) assigning
meaningful labels to assembly-level functions based on API
classification, (3) commenting the assembly code based on a
predefined dictionary of malware functions, and (4) applying a
window-based search and comparison mechanism for finding
the pre-analyzed code components.
A. Assembly to Open-Source Code Matching
The RE-Source framework [7] has been used for extracting
assembly-level features from Citadel. This framework exam-
ines assembly functions in both online and offline phases
in order to find source files that share features with the
disassembly. The key steps of the framework are: (1) ex-
traction of interesting features, (2) feature-based query en-
coding, (3) query refinement for online code search engines,
(4) request/response processing, (5) data extraction and pars-
ing, (6) reporting results and updating comments, and (7)
feature-based offline analysis. Different features are considered
for online and offline analysis. During the online analysis
phase, RE-Source revealed the correlation between function-
level features of Citadel and several open-source projects.
The video capture capability of the malware was unleashed
through links to source files such as: MHRecordContol.h, sto-
pRecord.c, trackerRecorder.h, signalRecorder.h, waitRecord.c,
etc. (See Figure 11). This observation was further supported
by occurrences of strings such as “_startRecord16” during the
dynamic API de-obfuscation. Moreover, a “video_start”
C&C command was also found in this process. Even though
screen capture is a common feature in modern malware, live
video capture capability is a new feature which is only seen
in complex and progressive samples. It should be noted that
the online analysis results of RE-Source suggesting video-
related capability were the outcome of an approximate code
matching process. Although the matching process was not
perfect, it was sufficiently accurate to reveal the functionality
context in this case. Similarly, RE-Source had commented the
code with references to other open-source projects such as
those listed in Figure 10. The number of matched projects
in each category determines the size of each pie slice. Many
Zeus-based malware variants have appeared online since the
release of Zeus source code in 2011. Having access to Zeus
source code enabled us to match Citadel binary against Zeus
source code. The pie chart in Figure 10 shows the general
categories of open-source projects used in Citadel. Apart from
the detached slices, Citadel and Zeus share a considerable
amount of code related to the core, VNC, crypto, and proxy
Fig. 10. Matched features with open-source projects.
functionalities. However, the differences can be summarized
in network communication code, new exploits and browser-
specific code for web injects.
B. Offline Analysis and Functionality Tags
RE-Source can also be used for tagging assembly functions
based on API calls and classifying functions according to their
potential functionality. When applied to the unpacked version
of Citadel, 652 functionality tags were detected by the offline
analyzer. A function is assigned several tags if it contains
more than one system call. Accurate functionality tags could
convey meaningful hints to the reverse engineer during the
static analysis phase. In conjunction with the code and data
cross-referencing, functionality tags can enrich the disassembly
by highlighting the final system calls in a multi-level function
call hierarchy. Since system calls serve as interaction points
with the operating system, having a high-level view of them
could draw a more organized view of the code.
Fig. 12. Functionality tags for offline analysis.
Functionality tags are not limited to simple system calls
for file processing or registry modifications. They can be
composed of several operations related to common malware
behavior. New patterns can be defined for highlighting com-
mon malicious code in downloaders, launchers, reverse shells,
remote calls and keyloggers based on the combination of
several simple system operations. In this context, process
memory modification and code injection points are of great
interest to the reverse engineer. RE-Source includes tagging
categories such as process injection, launcher, DLL injection,
process replacement, hook injection, APC injection and re-
source segment manipulation in the offline analysis. Figure 12
lists some of the available functionality tags in the prototype.
A practical application of functionality tags is in disassembly
comparison/synchronization of two malware variants. Instead
of comparing the files by address, the code can be analyzed
Fig. 11. The output of RE-Source pointing to video capture source code.
Fig. 13. Functionality tags assigned by offline analysis.
offline and the generated tags can be used as association
criteria/sync points. In this process, the functions are sorted
based on the assigned tags, and those with similar tags are
analyzed side by side. This technique was specifically helpful
in synchronizing the disassembly of Citadel versus Zeus.
Figure 13 depicts the detected functionality tags. The pie
chart sectors are proportional to the number of assembly
functions categorized under the same functionality group.
The NET tag was assigned to 60 functions related to low-
level socks. Furthermore, 41 functions were tagged with CRT
(critical section objects) for mutual exclusion synchronization.
Similarly, 36 FIL tags were assigned to file manipulating
functions. The other tags, such as crypto, hashing, search and
code injection, were also identified during the analysis. The
CRY (crypto) and HSH (hashing) tags provided an easy way
of disassembly synchronization between Citadel and Zeus as
the slight differences between the assembly files had no effect
on the overall functionality group.
Translated into quantifiable terms, Figure 14 shows the
output of RE-Source for Citadel vs. Zeus comparison. The
numbers are reported in accordance with occurrence of certain
features such as the number of assembly functions, API
and functionality tags, common API in malware, number of
matched opens source components, imported function calls,
and Unicode strings. The results imply that the framework
has been successful in revealing the internal components of
the malware. The final outcome of assembly to source code
matching is a list of source files alongside the description from
the malware dictionary. This information provides valuable
insight into the potential functionality of the malicious code
and facilitates the analysis.
Fig. 14. RE-Source analysis results.
C. Binary Clone Analysis
The malware analysis process can be accelerated by iden-
tifying and removing the previously analyzed code fragments.
The aim of binary clone analysis is to compare the assembly
file of a new binary sample with a repository of analyzed code.
The result of this analysis is a set of matched clones. In this
context, we rely on the RE-Clone binary clone detector tool [8]
that implements an improved version of the clone detector
framework proposed in [9]. RE-Clone considers the same prob-
lem definition, that is the exact and inexact clone detection, as
stated in [9]. Exact clones share the same assembly features,
i.e., mnemonics, operands and registers. The only difference
is in memory addresses. Inexact clones can be regarded as
equal up to a certain level of abstraction, which means that
the number of common features must be greater than a certain
threshold.
Fig. 15. Binary clone detection results.
Fig. 17. Code analysis after clone elimination.
The analysis parameters such as search window size,
normalization level and detection algorithm play a significant
role in the analysis results. These parameters are set according
to each analysis scenario. After marking the detected code
fragments as clones, the focus of analysis is shifted to non-
analyzed and new code segments. The core components of
the Zeus malware has been thoroughly studied in [6]. The
source and binary files are also available online. A new Zeus
variant can therefore be compared against the existing files
in order to measure the similarity and detect the potential
exact and inexact clones. This analysis is also applicable to
finding the additional functions of the new malware variant.
Figure 15 shows the results of the binary clone matching
process. The samples share 526 exact binary clones with a
window size of 15 instructions. In other words, almost 93%
of Zeus assembly code also appears in Citadel. These clones
form approximately 67% of the Citadel binary. This analysis
highlights the remaining 33% of the Citadel assembly to be
analyzed. Thus, a significant amount of time is saved by
disregarding the clones. RE-Clone shows the address of each
clone in the disassembly. Furthermore, the remaining functions
can be examined in RE-Source before the manual analysis
process is begun by the reverse engineer. This approach is
depicted in Figure 17. The 1876 inexact clones reported by the
tool include multiple combinations of regions that also contain
the exact clones.
An interesting example of crypt-related clones is the
detection of an inexact clone in the RC4 function that is
used for encrypting the C&C network traffic. There are a
few extra assembly instructions in the Citadel version of the
RC4 function. This clone was found with a threshold of 0.8
and a two-combination inexact clone search method. In this
approach, each two-combination of features is considered as
a cluster. If more than 80% of regions appear in the same
clusters, they are treated as inexact clones. The red segments
in Figure 16 highlight the detected inexact clones.
VI. THREAT MITIGATION BY SINKHOLING
In June 2013, the Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit reported
on an operation known as Operation b54 in collaboration
with the FBI to shut down Citadel C&C servers [14]. As
a result of this operation, 1400 Citadel botnets around the
world were interrupted and redirected to sinkhole servers
controlled by Microsoft. A comprehensive list of the domain
names is available in [16]. Although the operation significantly
disrupted Citadel botnets and reduced the threat levels, it also
affected honeypot systems that were used for identifying and
locating the malware creators and distributors. Despite the
overall success of the threat countermeasure, cyber criminals
can still operate by infecting new machines and controlling
their bots using alternative servers.
VII. RELATED WORK
AnhLab [11] presented a comprehensive static analysis
of Citadel malware. To the authors’ knowledge, this report
is the most complete analysis on Citadel malware that has
been released so far. The process of infection, the structure
of the malware binary, and the malware’s main functionalities
and features are explained in detail in this technical report.
The report gives valuable insight into the malware and its
capabilities; however, the methodology and steps that were
taken for reaching the outcomes were not discussed. Further-
more, despite mention in the report that Citadel is remarkably
similar to Zeus, the precise quantification of their similarity
is not provided. Only approximate resemblance percentages
is given without any details. To compare our analysis to this
work, we provided a new methodology for reverse engineering
malware by adopting clone-based analysis. Following our
methodology, we concisely explained the steps we took in
reverse engineering Citadel and the insight that we obtained
through our study.
SophosLabs [12] provided a brief report on Citadel mal-
ware. The major enhancements which occurred in Citadel
compared to Zeus is briefly explained in high-level in this
report. No explanation was provided about the process of
reverse engineering the malware and how the authors gained
those insights. Indeed, this report gave a modest overview
about the Citadel malware without digging into the details.
CERT Polska [13] also provided a technical report on Citadel
malware. Similar to the previously mentioned report, this
report was high-level and reviewed the main features of Citadel
without providing details. The reports mainly provided statis-
tics focusing on the impact of the malware and its geographical
distribution. The statistics were gathered based on the traffic
to the sinkhole server after the domain had been taken down.
By leveraging the tools developed in our security lab, we
quantified the similarity between the Zeus and Citadel mal-
ware. These results could be further refined by integrating other
existing techniques designed to automate malware analysis.
For instance, our binary clone detector could be extended with
a CFG-like dimension. For this purpose, we could benefit from
the model proposed in [21] which aims to identify the common
code fragments between two executable files and analyze the
CFG subgraphs containing these fragments.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Citadel malware targets confidential data and financial
transactions. It is an emerging threat against online privacy
and security. Citadel reverse engineering is challenging as it
is equipped with anti-reverse engineering techniques which
hinder the malware analysis process. As the number of in-
cidents entailing new malware attacks are increasing, agile
approaches are required for obtaining the analysis results in
a timely fashion. The malware reverse engineering process
consists of two major stages of static and dynamic analysis.
This process can be accelerated and enhanced by adding a
Fig. 16. An inexact clone detected in the RC4 encryption function (Citadel vs. Zeus).
new dimension for clone analysis. Instead of initiating the
process from scratch, a quick clone-based analysis can easily
highlight the similarities and differences between two samples
of the same family. The focus of analysis is then shifted
to the differing sections. We have presented a methodology
along with the tools and techniques for analyzing the Citadel
malware. We have also compared Citadel with its predecessor,
Zeus. The similarities have been quantified as the result of
two code matching techniques, namely assembly to source
and binary code matching. The same methodology can be
applied to other malware samples for providing insight into
the potential malware functionality. The results of the malware
analysis process can be added to a local code repository and
used as a reference for measuring the similarities between
future samples. They can also be used for improving the
accuracy of the results. Overall, the successful completion of
our objectives has led to underlining the best practices for
supporting real-world malware analysis scenarios.
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